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Without continued animal experimentation 
in the past, ... we should still be incapable 
of checking the ravages of septicemia, gan-
grene, diabetes, and a host of other 
diseases. Without continued experimen-
tation we shall be exposed to the new strains 
and new diseases that continue to emerge, 
golden staphylococcal infection, 
Legionnaire's Disease, AIDS, and the very 
many other diseases that are emerging. I 
But there are, of course, dozens of writers who 
opine that the decline in mortality due to infec-
tious diseases had much more to do with 
refinement in hygiene and sanitation than with 
medical techniques based on animal research.2 
Even on a much finer level of comparison, 
apparently contradictory views are not hard to 
find. Fred Davidson tells us that "the whole field 
of nutrition has its foundation firmly rooted in 
animal experimentation, which has led to the dis-
covery of diet essentials (such as all the known 
vitamins),"! while Sidney Gendin writes, "the 
foundation of nutritional science was the dis-
covery of vitamins, and their role in health owes 
almost nothing to animal experimentation.... 
When we consider the possibility of alterna-
tives to the use of animal models, we find that 
those who are most insistent about the value of 
medical experimentation are least sanguine 
about potential alternatives. McCloskey, for 
instance, calls the suggestion that needed infor-
mation could be gotten without animal experi-
mentation "little short of irresponsible.'" Dallas 
Pratt, on the other hand, maintains that research 
on several diseases is actually being slowed down 
by our reliance on in vivo techniques. 6 
In the light of all this, one might wonder 
whether the question of the prudence of animal-
based medical research weren't at least as contro-
versial as the question of its morality. Surely, 
insofar as such work is inessential - if we can 
easily make do without its contributions, or attain 
what results it does have to offer as well or better 
elsewise - then not only do the prospects for its 
successful moral defense pale to the point of 
invisibility, but the whole thing becomes a sterile 
ritual. My response to this uncertainty is to 
structure criteria for a kind of animal-based 
medical research which, if satisfied, would make 
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the issue of a significant clash of important 
human and nonhuman interests hard to avoid. I 
am therefore interested in medical research 
which exhibits the following qualities: 
1. it targets widespread, debilitating diseases; 
2. it has an admirable track record in using 
animals to aid in our understanding and 
management of the disease; and 
3. it is conducted according to humane stan-
dards as they are currently understood. 
I refer to any investigation meeting these criteria 
as "exemplary" medical research, and conclude 
that any such research at least meets the test of 
prudence. Whether it passes the stricter test of 
morality is the matter I will explore here. 
II. Diabetes as a Case Study 
Diabetes mellitus may not be at all a disease of 
any drama, but research on its causes and cures 
seems a likely candidate for inclusion under the 
"exemplary research" rubric. For diabetes, while 
yet widespread and debilitating, is no longer a 
disease which is liable to condemn its victims to a 
lingering and painful death, and this outcome is 
as clearly traceable to animal research, and (until 
recently) to animals as a source of insulin, as any-
thing is likely to be. Before 1921 diabetics had no 
better therapeutic recourse than to submit them-
selves to a severely restricted diet, which was cal-
culated to walk the often fine line between the 
amount of nutrition a patient had to have to live, 
and the amount which would overtax her com-
promised metabolism, causing glycosuria, dia-
betic coma, and death. For severe diabetics this 
therapy never involved more than a brief 
extension of life, and it was never pleasant. "A 
quarter of a cen tury after the discovery of 
insulin," writes Michael Bliss in his history of the 
research leading to the isolation of the hormone, 
"doctors were reminded of ... preinsulin dia-
betics when they saw the pictures of the survivors 
of Belsen and Buchenwald.'" 
Insulin was discovered primarily through the 
contributions of the Canadian scientists 
Frederick Banting and Charles Best, in collabo-
ration withJJ.R. Macleod,J.B. Collip, and several 
dogs. The dogs were rendered diabetic and then 
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treated with extracts of their own atrophied pan-
creases. The discovery had immediate and con-
tinuing therapeutic payoff. Bliss estimates that in 
1920 between 0.5 and 2.0 percent of the popu-
lation of the industrialized countries was dia-
betic; in a 1974 article, Best estimated that 130 
million lives had been saved by the discovery of 
insulin.8 There are today half a million insulin-
dependent diabetics in the U.S. alone. Even 
stern critics of animal research, such as Peter 
Singer and Andrew Rowan, have cited diabetes 
research as having had great human value.9 
But granted that diabetes was (and remains) 
widespread, and was (and to a lesser extent 
remains) debilitating, and that great strides 
against it were made through the use of animal 
research, it still remains to show that continued 
animal-based research on diabetes is of signifi-
cance. Things are not as clear here - there have 
been no further miracle breakthroughs with the 
impact of the discovery of insulin - yet there is 
reason to think that importan t progress is being 
made. 
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Although insulin has saved the lives of an 
immense number of people, it is not a cure; dia-
betes is still widespread and still debilitates. It is 
the seventh leading cause of death in the U.S., 
claiming about as many lives per year as arte-
riosclerosis or breast cancer, and about twice as 
many as hypertensive disease or leukemia. 10 
White males and females who are insulin-
dependent suffer a mortality rate five to eleven 
times greater than that for non diabetics of the 
same age; the mortality rate for black insulin-
dependent diabetics is about twice as high as 
their white coun terparts. l1 In addition to the 
increased risk of death, many diabetics suffer 
greatly from nervous, vascular, and ocular com-
plaints that often lead to such problems as 
blindness, loss of limbs, and impotence. 
Ongoing work in diabetes research is con-
cerned with its etiology, which is still imperfectly 
understood. It also addresses management of the 
physical consequences of long-term treatment of 
the diabetic state by exogenous insulin therapy, a 
problem medicine didn't face before 1921. And, 
of course, it seeks a cure. All this work uses 
various kinds of animal models. For example, the 
BB rat, a model of spontaneous diabetes, has 
provided evidence that diabetes is (or may be) an 
autoimmune disease; dogs are claimed to be 
useful models for the study of ocular complica-
tions typical of human diabetics; diabetic Yucatan 
miniature swine are prone to vascular com-
plaints, a critical problem in human beings; and 
the size and longevity of primates allow longitu-
dinal studies not feasible in smaller animals. 12 
That some of this work, at least, has thera-
peutic benefit is indicated by a 19 percent drop 
in the mortality rate associated with diabetes 
between 1970 and 1984.1> What is more, there is 
in fact now a cure for the disease - transplan-
tation of portions of the pancreas (so long as one 
is willing to swap dependence on cyclosporine 
for dependence on insulin). Many animal studies 
preceded this clinical advance and accompany 
ongoing efforts to refine it. There is currently 
special interest in the use of fetal pancreatic 
tissue as a graft source; diabetic rats have been 
cured in this fashion.1< There are also attempts to 
induce regeneration of insulin-producing cells; 
interesting results have been achieved in rat 
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models. And there is evidence of growing 
interest in the use of xenografts as sources of 
insulin producing tissue for diabetics. All this 
contains the promise that however damaging to 
the animal subjects involved, diabetes research is 
paying off for humans and that we may even be 
approaching effective therapies to end, rather 
than simply manage, the disease. 
Ill. Ethical Considerations 
So, it seems reasonable to regard diabetes 
research as something that it is prudent for our 
species to want. Is it something in which it is 
ethical for us to engage? 
This is a huge problem, hinging as it does on 
such perennially contested questions as how best 
to reason about moral choice. My goal here is to 
show how restricting our attention to exemplary 
research focuses those questions. In particular, I 
will examine the bearing of utilitarian and non-
utilitarian perspective on exemplary research. 
Is diabetes research justified on utilitarian 
grounds? Like so many such questions, it's a dif-
ficult one to answer, especially as it requires not 
simply the interpersonal but the interspecific 
comparison of utilities. It seems very reasonable 
to believe that the actual experiments Banting 
and Best performed were not only a prudent 
expenditure of resources (from a human point of 
view) but even welljustified from an impartialist, 
consequentialist perspective. But this is really not 
the comparison we need to make. Apologists for 
research often claim that it is the whole insti-
tution that ought to be assessed, not each indi-
vidual experiment - which seems fair enough. 
Accordingly, it isn't Banting and Best's extraor-
dinary success that needs to be weighed against 
the suffering of their animals, but the entire 
stream of research which flows into and out of 
their work, with all its reefs and obstructions. 
I want to raise three points about this question 
of the research's acceptability: one, that it is a 
real question, one that poses the vital interests of 
vast numbers of diabetics against those of many 
research animals: this isn't a matter of sacrificing 
animal in terests for taste or fashion. Second, 
because it is a real question, it's a tough one to 
resolve from a utilitarian framework. A person 
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can't simply recognize that nonhumans deserve 
equal consideration of interests, and immediately 
conclude that exemplary research is immoral, as 
one can perhaps concerning such horrors as 
maternal-deprivation studies. This leads me to 
my third claim: much will depend upon whether, 
and to what extent, the utilities available to 
typical humans are richer and more numerous 
than those available to typical nonhumans. 
To raise this last point with respect to many 
kinds of animal exploitation seems to me to be 
just a way of asking whether humans are "utility 
monsters" - so enamored of the taste of animal 
flesh or the look of leather that our pleasure in it 
outweights the pain we inflict in order to get it. 
But I don't think that we need to distort our own 
nature quite so much to make the issue troubling 
in the context of exemplary research. Regan 
holds that humans typically have greater oppor-
tunities for satisfaction than do nonhumans; this 
is why death is by and large a greater harm for us 
than for them. IS Sapontzis, on the other hand, 
notes that the variant keenness of animal senses 
makes it possible that nonhumans may have lush 
avenues of enjoyment open to them which are 
altogether closed to US. 16 
I'm not going to try to adjudicate this dispute 
now. It seems to me that given what we know 
about animals and about diabetes, it wouldn't be 
irresponsible for a person to conclude that 
research on the disease was justified by the conse-
quences. What is more troubling is the 
distribution of those consequences: one group-
humans - reaps virtually all the benefits. 
Another - nonhumans - bears virtually all the 
burden.17 If exemplary research is justified by 
utilitarianism, it is justified in a way that brings to 
life all the "textbook" refutations which allege 
that utilitarianism could in principle mandate a 
slave society. 
This brings us to nonutilitarian considerations. 
We intuitively shy away from the idea that we are 
merely receptacles of utility, and utilitarians can 
provide us with lots of plausible consequentialist 
reasons why we can act and think of ourselves as 
though we were something more. But those pro-
tections break down for nonhumans, and 
indeed, for them, utilitarianism presents its 
coldest, most calculating side. But the notion 
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that animals can be seen as mere receptacles is 
under serious pressure from all sides: "marginal 
case" arguments point to nonhumans' moral 
analogs with handicapped members of our own 
species; Sapontzis' work on the virtues points to 
analogs with our especially admirable con-
specifics;'8 and Regan and others have shown how 
and why such central properties as being the 
"subject of a life" also tie the value we bestow on 
ourselves much more closely to the value we 
should bestow on nonhumans. But I'm not going 
to argue for this, directly, either. Rather, I'm now 
going to proceed on the assumption that 
inclusion in an impartial utilitarian calculus does 
not exhaust what is of moral importance about 
animals and display the consequences for exem-
plary research. 
If nonhumans, pace utilitarianism, are pro-
tected by rights to life and to freedom from 
unnecessary, nontrivial suffering, it might seem 
that abolitionism simply follows. But that 
inference is too quick. For one thing, not all non-
humans may possess the requisite characteristics 
to be rights-bearers, and it is at least possible that 
different individuals may possess their rights with 
different degrees of stringency. For another, we 
do not generally hold that the rights of human 
persons secure them from any possible 
infringement of their individual welfare, so that 
even if animals generally possess rights of equal 
stringency to those typically possessed by 
humans, their involvement in exemplary medical 
research is not necessarily ruled out 
Regan's position, which presents itself as an 
abolitionism, has suggestive implications for the 
first of these challenges. To develop them, some 
empirical information will be useful. 
In 1988 the premier journal Diabetes reported 
253 original experiments. Humans were the 
animal of choice; 109 of the studies, or 43%, 
were performed on members of our species. Of 
the remaining 144 studies, 92 were performed 
on rats (including 7 on rat cell lines), and 31 on 
mice (including 2 on mice cell lines) . Ten studies 
involved dogs; 3 involved chicks, rabbits or ham-
sters; and 3 involved other celllines. '9 
The cell-line studies are the only ones that do 
not violate Regan's "rights view." He takes all the 
animals over a year of age to possess rights which 
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protect them from this sort of experimentation, 
while the chicks and any of the other baby 
animals, who might have rights that could be vio-
lated by this usage, are given the benefit of the 
doubt and classified as rights-bearers. 
-
If t seems to me that given what we 
II know about animals and about 
diabetes[ it wouldn't be irresponsible for 
a person to conclude that research on 
the disease was justified by the 
consequences. What is more troubling is 
the distribution of those consequences: 
one group - humans - reaps virtually all 
the benefits. Another - nonhumans -
bears virtually all the burden. If exemplary 
research is justified by utilitarianism[ it is 
justified in a way that brings to life all the 
textbook' refutations which allege that 
utilitarianism could in principle mandate a 
slave society. 
The strength of this argument will vary contex-
tually. Forbearing to use immature or nonmam-
malian animals in exemplary research on the 
grounds that they may be rights-bearers strikes 
me as very similar to the argument that we ought 
not to permit abortion because fetuses may be 
persons. The abortion argument overlooks the 
significance of the proposed restriction for 
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women, of whose status as persons we are (or 
should be) sure. Analogously, forbidding 
research on Regan's grounds too cavalierly dis-
misses the moral significance of the victims of 
diabetes, and of other debilitating and deadly 
diseases. 
Further, although Regan maintains that his 
view implies that all those who have inherent 
value have it equally, his argumen t for this 
position depends mainly on rejecting the com-
mensurability of intrinsic and inherent value. 
Thus, the greater richness he is willing to 
attribute to typical human experience is a matter 
of intrinsic value, and hence not relevant to 
determining fundamental moral rights, which 
are a function of inherent value. But it seems 
very likely that the psychological abilities under-
girding inherent value are themselves had in a 
graded fashion, so that inherent value may be 
realized differentially, as such things as desire, 
memory, preferences, and psychophysical 
identity over time are realized differentially in, 
say, rats and dogs. 
The upshot of these considerations is that 
exemplary research, since it is plausibly seen as 
justified by utilitarian considerations, might 
avoid running afoul of nonutilitarian constraints 
by ceasing to use certain animal models. Among 
its nonconsenting subjects, diabetes research 
relies heavily on rodents. Perhaps work on dogs 
and primates ought to be eliminated, and only 
studies involving (preferably immature) rats and 
mice continue, as such animals may have lesser 
inherent value. 
But even if all animals used in exemplary 
research have equally stringent rights, there is 
still reason to question whether complete abo-
lition of all research on nonconsenting subjects 
is morally necessary. 
Quite a strong case might be marshalled for 
abolition of invasive medical research on young 
children. If we agree that children ought to be 
regarded as ends-in-themselves, or anyway as pro-
tected by some such "deontological stop," then 
an appeal to benefits gained can't solely justify 
the interventions; if we regard parental preroga-
tives as justified solely by the parents' contri-
bution to their children's good, then any proxy 
consent on the part of a parent oversteps 
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allowable limits, since it may expose the child to 
risk and danger in a cause that is not directly in 
the child's interests.2o Yet pediatric research goes 
on - not, I think because of a social judgment 
that children don't count for much morally, but 
rather because parental discretion is taken to 
range further than assumed in the above 
position. 
It has, in my view, been persuasively argued 
that parents have the right to consent on behalf 
of their children to participate in low-risk, mildly 
invasive research, on the grounds that children 
are members of the community to whose weal 
the information is designed to contribute. They 
are not freely floating atoms, but part of a social 
whole; in part, at least, their good is a function of 
its good. Thus, they are not simply means to its 
ends; the ends of each overlap.21 Current federal 
guidelines allow participation in studies involving 
more than minimal risk, and which offer no 
direct benefit to the child; parental proxy 
consent must be supplemented by an institu-
tional review board, which must determine that 
the knowledge sought is indeed significant and 
that the risk is not too great. 22 
Does this suggest that nonhumans might at 
least be exposed to the same degree of inva-
siveness, suffering, and risk in exemplary 
research as that to which we are willing to expose 
our children? Clearly, the disanalogous feature is 
the roles that children and animals occupy in our 
society outside of the research context. This 
point is also germane to assessing the relevance 
of relying on involuntary conscription as a 
strategy for justifying exemplary research. 
H.J. McCloskey has used this idea in the 
course of arguing that, even granting that non-
human mammals have rights of the kind for 
which Regan argues, nothing very challenging 
follows for exemplary research.25 He directs our 
atten tion to the infamous case in which Regan 
supposes a dog to be stranded with four humans 
in a lifeboat. If somebody needs to be tossed over 
so that all the rest can survive, generally, Regan 
says, the dog ought to go. McCloskey sees this as 
committing Regan to the view that the rights to 
life of moral agents as such are more stringent 
than those of moral patients and continues, 
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-it is not only the right to life of persons that 
may outweigh the right to life of a dog. The 
rights to health, to bodily integrity, to self-
development of persons, as rights of 
recipience, may outweigh the rights of 
mammals such as dogs to life, and freedom 
from suffering. 
Hence, granted that mammalian rights are prima 
facie rights of recipience, the 
flood-gates are opened to justify animal 
experimentation that is scientifically and 
ethically well-planned, to secure for persons 
the enjoyment of the more stringent rights 
of persons, at the expense of the less 
stringent rights of mammals.2< 
He concludes that using animals as experimental 
subjects would not therefore be treating them as 
"mere receptacles" but rather as though they 
were fairly chosen conscripts facing death and 
injury in a just war. 
Now, as apiece of in ternal criticism of the 
rights view, this seems way off the mark. Regan's 
belief that one could dump a million dogs off the 
lifeboat to save one person doesn't hinge on any 
general position about moral agents and moral 
patients but rather about the relevance of 
unequal harms faced by the possessors of equally 
stringent rights. Nor does it seem at all clear how, 
even if moral agents had some advantage over 
moral patients regarding the stringency of their 
right to life, it would follow that all their other 
moral rights could trump the right to life of 
moral patients. 
But McCloskey's final point remains of some 
interest, for involuntary conscription, like pedi-
atric research, need not be based on any belief 
about the lack of stringency of the rights of 
children or conscripts. McCloskey's concern is to 
justify the "special place" that animals are to have 
in this system of conscription by virtue of their 
lesser rights. Mine is to explore what the general 
conditions on justified involuntary commitment 
imply for research on the assumption that the 
moral status of relevant nonhumans is equivalent 
to that of humans. 
Involuntary conscription may outrage liber-
tarian sentiments, but it does seem that commu-
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M oral questions concerning animal research are not simply 
questions about what ought or ought not 
to go on in laboratories. These are 
questions for all of us who benefit from 
contemporary health care. If we want 
these benefits to continue, we may have 
to participate ourselves in the research 
process that produces them and at the 
same time make nonhumans a part of the 
moral community to whose good their 
sacrifices contribute. 
nities may face serious threats which can only be 
met through conscription of its members. 
Imagine the appearance of a variant of AIDS 
which spread on casual contact and which did 
not observe species barriers. I can see no serious 
objection to conscripting both humans and non-
humans as research subjects in an effort to cure 
the disease (which is not at all the same thing as 
saying that researchers would have carte blanche 
with their conscripts). 
\Vhat of situations where it isn't so clear that 
nobody has anything much to lose? Even in those 
cases, I think, we're generally disposed to counte-
nance conscription in the face of grave dangers, 
when there is no practical way less restrictive of 
liberty to meet the danger. 
But while these conditions are probably nec-
essary for justifying the involuntary conscription 
of rights-bearers, they are surely not sufficient. 
It may be instructive to look to the "just war" 
tradition to illuminate the character of a threat 
to which conscription is a defensible response. 
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Just war theory attempts to present and defend 
conditions which justify trumping the rights of 
others to life and to the enjoyment of their 
property. It may be that in current contexts, or 
even categorically, the burden of justifying war is 
too great for those conditions to bear. But even 
so, they may still be useful as guidelines for 
trumping the rights of individuals involved in 
nonvoluntary participation in medical research. 
Two aspects of the tradition seem especially rel-
evant: the insistence that the war in question be 
winnable, and the condition of proportionality.25 
Both of these conditions are intended to avoid 
moral waste: the violence and other destruc-
tiveness associated with a war are not justifiable 
unless the good aimed at is in fact attainable, and 
no more such evils are justified than are abso-
lutely necessary to attain the end. 
It might seem that the conditions are too vague 
to guide practice, but I think that need not be so. 
Exemplary research's insistence on a demon-
strable record of achievement in using animal 
models to ameliorate disease coheres nicely with 
the first of them and reinforces the condition as a 
selection criterion for the kinds of diseases against 
which invasive animal-based research may be 
employed; concern with proportionality under-
scores the need to press on with refinement, 
reduction, and replacement strategies. 
Proportionality may also have an impact on 
species selection. If, for example, one accepts the 
suggestion that members of different species will 
typically suffer different degrees of harm in being 
restrained, or in dying, this condition would insist 
on the use of those species which will suffer the 
least. A proportionality condition might therefore 
bolster the distribution of species typical of dia-
betes research and might dovetail with suspicions 
about the unequal stringency of animal rights to 
support a virtual ban on the use of animals other 
than roden ts in research. 
There are other reasonable requirements: 
equity in the assignment of burdens, compen-
sation for those who have served. And always, the 
rights of conscripts must be respected insofar as 
such respect is compatible with meeting the threat 
that generates conscription in the first place. 
But before these conditions come into play, a 
more fundamental and much more problematic 
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condition would have to be satisfied: all the con-
scripts must belong to the community being 
threatened, in the sense that individual and com-
munity interests are in large measure shared, as 
in the justification for pediatric research. 
What motivates these conditions generally is 
the need to make a real distinction between 
serving the community as a slave and serving it 
as a conscript. In McCloskey's conception the 
assertion that animals used in research are 
rights-holders has no apparent significance; they 
are treated solely as means to ends in which they 
have no stake. Things are different for those 
justly conscripted to serve the community, 
whether they be children in pediatric research 
or soldiers fighting in a just war (if any there 
be); these individuals have an in terest in the 
community's maintenance and development. 
Now, if Regan and others who hold to a strong 
equivalence between the moral status of persons 
and animals are right, then research - even 
invasive, sometimes lethal research - might still 
be permissible. But the character and the 
context of that research would have to alter dras-
tically. We would have to see ourselves as a com-
munity fully mobilized against disease, one 
which regarded diabetes, cancer, AIDS, and so 
forth as enemies against which we were pre-
pared to direct the paths of our lives, not simply 
to contribute money. But even if McCloskey is 
right, and moral patients enjoy less stringent 
rights than do moral agents, it does not follow 
that casting research subjects in the role of con-
scripts will open any floodgates. For if research is 
to be justified on these grounds, we are still 
faced with the challenge of making animals a 
part of the community to whose weal their sac-
rifice contributes. Otherwise, we treat them as if 
they were mere receptacles of value, not valuable 
in themselves. 
Making animals members of this community 
would be an immense task, and I am not sure 
exactly what would constitute success. Minimally, 
bringing about some substantial identity of 
interests between humans and nonhumans 
would require ending their exploitation at our 
hands for food, clothing, and entertainment and 
taking their interests seriously into account in 
making public policy decisions that affect them. 
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Even granted such sweeping changes, it may 
seem that the situation of human conscripts is 
too importantly different from those of animals 
to justify the analogy. Conscripted soldiers, for 
example, presumably feel an identification with 
their community. There are likely to be indi-
viduals at home for whom they care, buteven if 
not, they may well have a regard for the institu-
tions, the traditions, and the values which charac-
terize their society. It may not be too fanciful to 
say that their own identities are constituted, in 
part, by their community membership. 
This kind of identification with individuals and 
values isn't possible for nonhumans; their psy-
chologies just don't work that way. But neither is 
it possible for very young children. They, of 
course, may come to care about their commu-
nities in ways nonhumans cannot. But if this is so, 
it is likely to be because they will in fact benefit 
from its flourishing. So perhaps it is not the 
intensional state of caring about a community 
that's key but the actual benefits that conscripts 
receive from their community. 
It's sometimes said that what animals really 
need from us is simply to be left alone, but given 
the impact of our species upon this planet, this is 
probably too simple. And even were this not the 
case, leaving animals alone is a radical departure 
from our current practices and would involve 
considerable forbearance on our part. A society 
of that kind would be one in whosemaintenance 
animals would have an interest. And although 
the kind of health enhancement to which even 
exemplary medical research would contribute 
might not advance those interests further, it is 
probably not in general necessary that conscripts 
be personally benefitted by the contributions 
they make. That a community is so structured as 
to respect the rights of its members may itself be 
sufficient grounds to see the interests of indi-
viduals and the community as something they 
hold in common. 
Furthermore, if the enterprise of research 
medicine is really so important to us, we may 
have to impose some kind of nonvoluntary par-
ticipation in research by humans as well. Equity 
does not demand identical treatment, of course; 
there are differences in vulnerabilities among 
species which would make subjecting humans (or 
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monkeys) to the kind of confinement and rigors 
undergone by rodents altogether inequitable. 
But if we have to look solely to involuntary con-
scription as a means of overcoming the pre-
sumption against using animals as means to our 
ends, we may have to demonstrate our good faith 
by participation in the process ourselves. 
IV. Conclusion 
Ethical investigation of the use of animal 
models in research at once needs to become 
more fine-grained and more expansive in scope. 
We would do well to pay closer attention to the 
ways in which such an en terprise as diabetes 
research differs from, say, toxicity testing or pain 
research. We ought also to learn more about the 
particular character of specific animal models. 
But we should remember as well that the moral 
questions concerning animal research are not 
simply questions about what ought or ought not 
to go on in laboratories. These are questions for 
all of us who benefit from contemporary health 
care. If we want these benefits to continue, we 
may have to participate ourselves in the research 
process that produces them and at the same time 
make nonhumans a part of the moral community 
to whose good their sacrifices contribute.26 
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"Dreaming Eden" 
Rainbows of fish, 
streamers of dolphins.  
A celebration for the world. 
Pods of whales breaching, 
great hands splashing 
in a bowl of diamonds .. 
Shadows on the forest carpet 
were just the wings of eagles.  
The redwood had no enemies. 
Velvet cats walked the night.  
Elephants and wolves had nothing 
to fear. 
Weavings of jungle and swamp 
abandoned on the loom. 
Home only to those who belonged 
there. 
Water was clean, 
air was visible. 
Earth was colonized by flowers. 
No one here can remember, 
but it must have been quite a time. 
- Kathleen Malley 
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